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Abstract 
 
Background: Economic theory strongly suggests that better information about the quality 
of care affects patients’ choice of health service providers. However, we have little 
empirical evidence about the impact of information provided on provider’s choice in 
Germany. Problem: In Germany, we recently find publicly available information about 
hospital quality. For example, 50 percent of the hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr area do now 
publish their quality data voluntarily in a comprehensive, understandable and well prepared 
publication. Empirically, we see a strong demand for this publication. However, we do not 
have information so far, if – and how – this information affect patients’ choice of hospitals.  
Data and methodology: We take cross sectional time series data from more than 700.000 
patients in the Rhine-Ruhr area and in the Cologne-Bonn area (control group) for the time 
period 2003 to 2006, i.e. 16 quarters. We examine whether the publication of quality 
information affects market shares and number of cases of the hospitals as well as travelling 
distance that patients accept to get to the hospital of their choice. In order to account for 
hospital-specific heterogeneity, we use fixed and random effects models. Results: First: 
Hospitals, which publish their quality data voluntarily, do attract more patients – compared 
to such hospital, that do not publish their quality data. Second: In the group of the 
publishing hospitals, hospitals with a higher than average quality slightly increased their 
market shares, whereas hospitals with a lower than average quality lost market shares. 
Conclusion: The provision of quality data has a significant impact on hospital choice: a 
higher quality leads to a higher demand. Based on these finding decision makers in 
hospitals have strong incentives (i) to make quality information publicly available and (ii) 
to keep their quality of care high.  
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1 Introduction 
Germany's health-care policy initially attempts to achieve quality in health care with the 
instrument of legal regulation. One of the reasons is the scepticism towards market regula-
tions with regard to quality assurance. The scepticism refers to the uncertainty as to if and 
how the consumers react to quality information. The respond of patients to quality infor-
mation by reallocating demand from low to high-ranked providers is the basic prerequisite 
for functional quality competition within a Diagnosis-Related-Groups-based payment sys-
tem (Ma 1994), which was introduced in 2003 into the German hospital sector. If individu-
als “vote with their feet” and select hospitals with higher quality ratings, it may be possible 
to achieve quality improvements without assuring hospital quality with the instrument of 
legal regulation. How existing quality information in Germany influences the selection of 
the treating hospital is therefore the focus of this study. 
 
Past evidence on this question is mixed, with some studies finding that more highly rated 
hospitals extend their market share and others finding a more marginal impact of report 
cards on hospital choice (Comp. section 2). Most studies refer to the USA, where the pub-
lication of quality information has been established for almost two decades (Marshall, 
Shekelle and Letherman 2000, Robinowitz and Dudley 2006). So far, there are no system-
atic studies in Germany assessing the influence of published quality information on hospi-
tal choice. With quality information only recently becoming available, an impact analysis 
as such has not been possible so far. However, since 2005 transparency in regards to qual-
ity of hospitals has increased due to legal regulation obliging every hospital to publish 
quality reports according to § 137 Social Code Book (SGB) V. So far, it has to be criti-
cized that these reports are incomprehensive (insufficient process and outcome data) and 
badly prepared (Breckenkamp, Wiskow and Laaser 2007).  
 
In contrast to these deficiencies of published quality data in Germany at a whole, a regional 
clinic guide in the Rhine-Ruhr-area known as “Klinikführer Rhein-Ruhr” published com-
prehensive, understandable and well prepared data on hospital quality in September 2005 
(Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet 2005). Every second regional hospital voluntarily participated in 
this report. Even though this information – available in printed form and on the Internet - 
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was in strong demand, its effects on patients’ behaviour have hitherto not been examined. 
Therefore it is this study's objective to use the “Klinikführer Rhein-Ruhr” as a basis to ex-
amine whether information on the treatment quality has an influence on the selection of the 
treating hospital. 
 
On top of first time delivering evidence for the impact of report cards on hospital choice in 
Germany, this paper offers two extensions to the existing literature on report cards. Firstly, 
we present a stochastic model generating new theoretical evidence that voluntary publish-
ing hospitals attract additional patients even in the case that the hospitals quality corre-
spondents to the expected quality before publication.1 Secondly, we take advantage of a 
different in different estimation strategy for testing the causal impact of voluntary report 
cards on hospital choice: we assess not only market shares and case numbers of publishing 
and non publishing hospitals after relative to before the publication of the Klinikführer 
Rhein-Ruhr, but also we compare these results with the developments of hospital market 
shares and case numbers in the control-region Cologne-Bonn. This region serves as natural 
control group, since in Cologne-Bonn no adequate quality data were publicly available, 
yet. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 displays an overview of the current status of 
research regarding quality information's influence on patient behaviour (and that of refer-
ring physicians). Section 3 presents the stochastic model, serving as theoretical foundation 
for our empirical analysis. Section 4 leads to the empirical analysis, where we introduce 
the data record, perform first descriptive analyses and describe the used estimation proc-
esses. Section 5 presents the results of our analysis. The paper ends with a discussion on 
results and a conclusion. 
2 What we know about the influence of quality information 
2.1 How patients react to quality information 
                                               
1
 In our model hospital choice depends among other factors on the expected quality and the uncertainty about 
the expected quality. The uncertainty itself is assumed to be reduced by the publication of quality data. The 
model basically shows that – ceteris paribus – not only good hospitals are preferred against bad hospitals, 
but also that voluntary publishing hospitals are on average preferred against non-publishing hospitals. 
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Studies examining the effect of quality information on patient demand behaviour usually 
have its setting in the USA. These can be divided into two groups on the basis of the se-
lected methodical procedure. 
The first group of examinations is based on surveys, whereby the patients are asked 
whether published information has influenced their decision to select certain service pro-
viders.  
 
This method has already been used by Schneider and Epstein (1996) for the evaluation of 
the Pennsylvania Coronary Bypass Graft Surgery Report – which received a lot of atten-
tion in literature and from the press. The authors were able to show that only 14 of 474 
questioned patients consulted information on the hospital for their selection of a clinic. 
However, only 56 of questioned patients had been aware of the reports in the first place. 
More recently patient surveys also refer – for the USA – to a low degree of utilization and 
awareness of patients to published quality reports (e.g. Schwartz, Woloshin and Birke-
meyer 2005). In Germany, the Bertelsmann Foundation has evaluated the effect of the pub-
lication of obligatory quality reports acc. to § 137 SGB V and also determined a very low 
influence of quality reports on patients’ choices in regards to hospitals (Geraedts (2006) 
showing that only 4 % of those questioned were aware of the reports. In Summary, surveys 
find a low impact of report cards on hospital choice.  
 
The method of the second group of examinations is evaluating, how market share and case 
numbers of service provider changed after publication on information about its rendered 
services. This method has an advantage over the survey (first group) as it also displays the 
indirect effects of published data. Thus the published information could have been per-
ceived by the role players, whose recommendations decisively influence the patients' selec-
tion of hospitals. The number of cases and market shares thus also reflect changes in refer-
ral behaviour and/or changed recommendations from friends and relatives on account of 
the published information. Past evidence for the impact of report cards on hospital choice 
is mixed, with some studies finding that more highly rated providers increase their market 
shares (e.g. Mukamel and Mushlin 1998, Wedig and Tae-Seale 2002, Romano and Zhou 
2004, Cutler et al. 2004, Bundorf et al. 2008) and others finding a more marginal impact of 
quality information on hospital choice (e.g. Baker et al. 2003, Howard and Kaplan 2006, 
Jha and Epstein 2006). A series of these examinations (Mukamel and Mushlin 1998, 
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Romano and Zhou 2004, Cutler et al. 2004 as well as Jha and Epstein 2006) referred to the 
New York State Cardiac Surgery Reporting System (CSRS), much heeded in the USA and 
considered as the Gold Standard in quality information publications (Jha and Epstein 2006, 
p. 844). 
 
Methodically, one set of high quality studies examines market shares of providers after 
relative to before the adoption of report cards, just like we do (e.g. Wedig and Tai-Seale 
2002 or Dafny and Dranove 2005). These studies define the effect of the report card as the 
difference in the change of market share, after versus before adoption and between highly 
rated providers and those who are poorly rated by the report card (Bundorf et al. 2008, p. 
3f.). Another set of high quality studies analyses the relationship between market shares 
after the implementation of a report card (e.g. Cutler et al. 2004). These examinations de-
fine the effect of the report cards as the correlation between market shares and published 
quality over time holding constant hospital characteristics. Both types of studies take ad-
vantage of panel data using fixed-effects to allow for time-invariant correlation between 
reported and unobserved quality. More recently Bundorf et al. (2008) extend previous lit-
erature on report cards in the context of the market for assisted reproductive therapy (ART) 
services. Within an innovative approach using an unobserved quality measure – available 
before and after the release of the report card – the authors were able to control for unob-
served time variant quality information. Using a difference in difference estimation strat-
egy they found, clinics with higer birth rates had larger market shares after relative to be-
fore the adoption of report cards. Notwithstanding these recent results, to sum up evidence 
of the impact of report cards remains mixed indicating only a (weak) positive correlation 
between the published – i.e. discernable – hospital quality and the market share of a hospi-
tal. 
 
2.2 Why patients do not always react to quality information 
 
Apart from the lack of awareness regarding published data, an important cause for the in-
sufficient utilisation of quality information is seen in the misalignment of existing quality 
information (Schaeffer 2006).  
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This result is also determined by Marshall et al. (2000) in their systematic literature evalua-
tion of studies published according to a peer-review procedure: insufficient interest of pa-
tients to use quality data for decision making is mostly caused by the fact, that available 
information for patients is badly prepared and incomprehensible, not regarded as relevant, 
and that patients do not place their trust in the provided data. Similar findings for the insuf-
ficient use of quality information arise from more recent studies (Dealey 2005, Mannion 
and Goddard 2003). Finally, studies show that referring GP's display a large degree of 
scepticism towards published data, which are therefore hardly used. If asked for the causes, 
the reliability of quality data was doubted (53 percent of those questioned), insufficient risk 
adjustment of data (79 percent of those questioned) and the limitation of published quality 
variables on the "Mortality" indicator (79 percent) is criticised (Schneider and Epstein 
1996, Casalino et al. 2007). Having in mind these deficiencies of published report cards we 
describe in the following section the quality measurement framework of the Klinikführer 
Rhein-Ruhr. Doing so we deliver arguments why we use the Klinikführer as an adequate 
object for evaluating the potential impact of report cards on hospital choice. 
2.3 Evaluation object: the "Klinikführer Rhein-Ruhr"  
The Klinikführer Rhein-Ruhr (Clinic Guide) was published in the Internet and as printed 
media in September 2005 by the Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet and The Boston Consulting 
Group.2 More than 30,000 copies were sold and with more than 2.5 million accesses 
(within two years), displayed a considerable interest in the information (Initiativkreis Ruhr-
gebiet 2007). 74 hospitals and thus more than half of the hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr re-
gion voluntarily participated in the transparency initiative. In our opinion, the "Klinik-
führer Rhein-Ruhr" represents a well-suited examination object for the effectiveness analy-
sis of quality information, as important theoretical and empirical findings on the use and 
increase of this influence of quality information were implemented. (Initiativkreis Ruhrge-
biet 2005).  
Firstly, the Klinikführer Rhein-Ruhr publishes comprehensive quality information. This is 
done by the questioning of patients (among others questions on satisfaction in the physi-
cian-patient relationship, treatment success, care) and referrers (Where would you refer 
yourself or your family for treatment?). Further the clinic guide contains the description of 
                                               
2
 The Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet is a consortium of 64 leading commercial enterprises (among others, EON-
Ruhrgas, Deutsche Bank). Together, they employ almost 1.7 million people worldwide, with a turnover of 
almost 480 billion Euros. Comp. Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet (2007). 
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the hospital's experience with certain operations (case numbers analysis) and the descrip-
tion of process and outcome indicators (Initiativkreis Ruhrgebiet 2005). Latter Data are 
measured by an independent service agency, the Federal Office for Quality Assurance 
(Bundesgeschäftsstelle Qualitätssicherung or BQS).3 Secondly, we consider the data are 
prepared in a user-friendly manner (among others simple rating scales - 4-point system, 
highly aggregated indicators) and distributed through various channels (Internet, in book 
form, press releases). Thirdly, we observed that the conception of the Clinic Guide in-
cluded important findings on the increased trust of patients and potential referrers in the 
published data. For example questioning of physicians and referrers was conducted under 
the management of an independent institute (Pickert Institute Germany). Fourthly, the sur-
vey directly included GP's as important referrers, which increased the awareness level of 
the Clinic Guide among the resident physicians (feedback quota of the survey 26 %). 
Fifthly, the Clinic Guide encompasses a region with a high population and hospital density, 
which denotes closely located treatment alternatives for the patients. 
3 Theoretical modelling of hospital selection and hypotheses  
3.1 Theoretical modelling   
 
The following assumes that each enquirer of hospital services behaves like a utility maxi-
miser and maximises the utility function N allocated to him. The following factors are as-
sumed as determinants of the individual utility function N: N= f(q, D, a). The following 
applies: q = q(K) = actual quality of hospital K, D = D(K) = Distance to the hospital K, a 
=Age of patient, c > 0 = Weighting parameter and α < 1 = Weighting parameter. For sim-
plicity we restrict our model to the one disease case. We specify the individual utility func-
tion Nα through  
(1)  fα (q, D, a) :=. 
acD
q
∗+1
α
 
                                               
3
 The BQS tasks focus on the external comparative quality management which is obligatory for almost every 
hospital in Germany. The BQS was launched in 2001 and since then is coordinating the processes for ob-
taining and providing the benchmarking information for hospitals. All German hospitals are participating 
in the external Quality Assurance procedures organised along federal and state based offices. Comp. 
Breckenkamp, J. et al. (2007). Generally the BQS data are not published, but used for external quality as-
surrance. 
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The utility function gives the enquirer-patient a different value for each hospital, as vari-
ables q and D depend on the hospital K. We assume that the actual quality of the hospital 
positively influences the utility of the enquirer-patient, but that the marginal utility with 
regard to q is reduced (as α < 1). As the distance of the patient from the hospital grows, the 
utility is reduced depending on the age. According to our assumptions, the utility function 
of older patients reacts - according to empirical experience (Varkevisser and van der Geest 
2007, Tai et al. 2004) – more sensitive to increasing distance, i.e. the distance parameter is 
given a higher weighting in the utility function.  
 
The recently displayed utility function refers to the situation, in which the enquirer-patient 
is provided with the complete information on the quality of the respective hospital. How-
ever, this assumptions cannot be confirmed in reality, as quality information in health care 
is usually only available to a limited degree and not accessible to a large majority of the 
public. Thus, in a utility function adjusted to reality, the "actual quality q" must be replaced 
by the "evaluated Q".  This "evaluated quality" (= perceived or realised quality) therefore 
represents, from the mathematical point of view, the realisation Q(ω) of a random variable 
Q, as information on the properties of hospitals is supported by own experiences or reports 
from friends, acquaintances and relatives trusted by the patients (e.g. Sauerland 2003, p. 
265f.). However, this information does not need to comply with the actual quality, because 
at the time of transmission of information, the respective assessments of actual information 
are interrupted by the given quality on account of subjectivity.  
 
Below it is assumed that the enquiring patients are able to assess the extent of uncertainty 
with regard to the quality achieved by them and attach less importance to the quality in the 
utility function sensed (perceived) by them  in the event of growing uncertainty. We there-
fore recommend the following utility function: 
(2)  fα (Q, D, a) := 
ac
Q
D
Q
∗+1
))(( 2σα
.  
The weaker weighting of the perceived quality associated with the larger uncertainty is 
modelled, assuming that the α = α (σ2(Q)) function drops monotically in σ2(Q) (variance). 
To ensure reducing marginal utility with regard to the perceived quality, we demand that 
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(3)  
0))((
lim
2 →Qσ  α (σ
2(Q)) < 1.  
As a function of Q, the utility function defined above is a random variable. However, every 
economic entity experiences a realisation of these random variable over the perceived qual-
ity, whereby there is uncertainty regarding the representation of the realisation.  The thus 
defined utility function now fulfils the economically expedient assumptions (f´(Q) > 0 and 
f´´(Q) < 0) and complies with the empirical evidence: a positive, age-dependent over-
proportional distance aversion. We will use the above-mentioned utility function to de-
scribe the effect of quality information on the above-mentioned utility function, whereby 
we assume that quality can be measured to a certain extent with the help of objective crite-
ria (Sauerland 2003, p. 265ff). The publication of quality-related data in a generally com-
prehensible manner results in the presence of objective information on the random variable 
Q. The enquirer-patient can therefore use this information and experiences a new realisa-
tion of quality perceived by him, which is, however, based on scientific data and is less 
subjective, thus seemingly more representative.4 
Therefore the uncertainty with regard to perceived quality is reduced. Now we would like 
to include the publication of quality-related data in our utility function. The utility function 
from (2) is then given the form:  
(4) fα (Q, D, a) := 
ac
IQE
D
Q
•+1
))|)((( 2σα
,  
whereby E(σ2 (Q)|I)) is the expected value of the conditional variance and is defined by  
(5) E(E(σ2 (Q)|I)) := E(Q2) − E(E(Q|I)2). 
From a mathematical point of view, the Q variance drops in average by giving rise to the 
information I and is explained in the following models of the expectancy value of the con-
ditional variance. The right side of (5) can be written as 
(6) E(Q2) − E(E(Q|I)2) = σ2(Q) + E(Q)2 − E(E(Q|I)2)  
In the case of unavailable objective quality information, the mathematical rules for condi-
tional expectations can be used to verify the following: 
(7) E(E(Q|I)2) = E(Q)2.  
                                               
4
 This especially applies to technical quality, which can be measured on the basis of objective criteria (e.g. 
Complication Rates). 
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If (7) is now entered in (6) and this in turn in (5), one will receive: 
(8) E(E(σ2(Q)|I)) = E(Q2) − E(Q)2 =: σ2 (Q). 
This means that in the case of unavailable quality information, the expectation value of the 
conditional variance complies with the variance itself. The amount of information required 
to reduce the uncertainty about the perceived quality can be deduced from Equation 6. This 
shows: The expectation value of the conditional variance is smaller than the variance (and 
the uncertainty is lower), if  
(9)  E(Q)2 − E(E(Q|I)2) > 0.  
The case of unavailable quality information has already been considered. We will now 
discuss the case of complete quality information. This formally means that the σ -Algebra 
A created from I is equivalent to σ -Algebra created from Q. This makes Q measurable 
related to A in equation (9). However, applying the arithmetic rules for conditional expec-
tations, the consequence is 
(10) E(E(Q|I)2) − E(Q)2 = E(Q2) − E(Q)2 = σ2(Q).  
If this is in turn integrated into (5), one will receive 
(11) E(E(σ2(Q)|I)) = E(Q2) − E(E(Q|I)2) = 0. 
This is what is expected from the model, as in the case of complete quality information, the 
perceived quality complies with the actual quality and there is no uncertainty. Furthermore, 
our defined factor of the conditional variance's expectation value can be used to show, that 
uncertainty is reduced in the case of increasing quality information, i.e. for two σ –Algebra 
I and J with I ⊂  J the following is valid: 
(12) E(E(σ2(Q)|J)) ≤ E(E(σ2(Q)|I)).  
 
Proof: Definition 5 and the mathematical regulations for conditional expectations result in: 
(13)  E(E(σ2(Q)|I)) = E(X2) − E(E(X|I)2). 
E(E(σ2(Q)|J)) = E(X2) − E(E(X|J)2). 
Therefore the argument is logical if we can show that 
E(E(X|J)2) ≥ E(E(X|I)2).  
This would be: 
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(14) E(E(X|J)2) = E(E(E(X|J)2)|I) 
≥
Jensen
 E(E(E(X|J)|I)2) 
      = E(E(X|I)2) 
3.2 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses in the empirical analysis below will be tested on the basis of this 
theoretical consideration: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The publication of quality information has reduced patient uncertainty. 
Therefore published hospitals extend their market share or case numbers when compared 
with competing – non-publishing – hospitals.  
 
Hypothesis 2: From the total of publishing hospitals, those hospitals with over-average 
quality tend to be preferred to competing hospitals with a quality below average. In other 
words: "good hospitals" should be able to extend their market shares or case numbers in 
comparison to "poor hospitals".   
4 Data and estimation method 
4.1 Data 
We revert to a pooled data record containing cross-sectional and longitudinal data, which 
was basically fed from two sources. Patient data from the data base of the "Allgemeinen 
Ortskrankenkassen (AOK)" [General Medical Insurance Plans] were specifically used to 
calculated the dependent variables (A. Case Numbers, B. Market Shares).5 Quality vari-
ables from the Klinikführer Rhein-Ruhr 2005/2006 were then deduced and included in the 
patient data.  
The period from 2003 to 2006 was selected as the analysis period to analyse data before 
and after publication of quality information and to specifically examine the influence of 
publication activity. The Clinic Guide was published in September 2005. The regional fo-
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cus of the analysis is on the Rhine-Ruhr region as well as on the metropolitan area of Co-
logne-Bonn, which was included as the control group. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
WIDO supplied data of 700.000 patients from the AOK database for the quarters I/2003 to 
IV/2006.6 Apart from information on the treatment venue and patient residence - each with 
specification of the 5-digit postal code - this data also contained information on age, sex 
and the time of treatment. Not only AOK-specific case numbers, but also the market shares 
of the examined hospitals were distinguished according to quarters, age groups (5-year age 
groups) and sex with the help of this data. The calculation of market shares for alternative 
spatial market delineation was conducted as follows: during a first step, the Pythagorean 
Theorem - and the use of postal code-specific geographical coordinates - was used for each 
hospital to determine the distance to the other hospitals. Then we determined those hospi-
tals within a radius of 35 and 50 km. These radiuses were also recommended and referred 
to for spatial market delineation in other studies, which included market share calculations 
(Siciliani and Martin 2007). During a third step we calculated the market shares of the hos-
pital for the alternative market share delineation, in which the number of patients treated in 
the hospital were divided by the total number of hospital cases in the spatial environment 
of the hospital.  
 
Explanatory variables and control variables 
 
Various 0-1-coded dummy variables were formed to examine whether the voluntarily pub-
lished hospitals, compared to the competing non-publishing hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr 
region, were able to expand their case numbers or market shares. One dummy variable was 
formed for the period before and after the publication of the Clinic Guide ("After Publica-
tion"). A further dummy variable was formed to differentiate between the Rhine-Ruhr re-
                                                                                                                                              
5
 This data was made available by the "Wissenschaftliche Institut der Ortskrankenkassen (WIDO)" [Scientific 
Institute of the General Medical Insurance Plans].  
6
 With 36 %, AOK is market leader among the public medical aids, which in turn denote approx. 90 % of 
policy holders. Comp. AOK-Bundesverband (2007).  
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gion ("Rhine-Ruhr") and the control group Cologne-Bonn as well as a further dummy vari-
able to identify the voluntarily publishing hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr region ("Pub-
lished"). Table 1 displays the most important variables taken into consideration in the as-
sessment models.  
 
Table 1: Dependent, descriptive and control variables 
Variable                                                                         Description 
Dependent variables 
Case numbers = Hospital case numbers 
Market share35 = Hospital market share for the market delineation of 35 km 
Market share50 = Hospital market share for the market delineation of 50 km 
Log_Distance = average logarithmized distance of the treated patient to the hospital  
Descriptive variables (measured on hospital level) 
Rhine-Ruhr = 1, if hospital in Rhine-Ruhr region, otherwise 0 
After Publication = 1, if treatment took place from III quarter 2005, otherwise 0 
Publishing Hospital = 1, if quality information is published, otherwise 0 
Good hospitals = 1, if the hospital counts as one of the relatively goods hospitals, otherwise 0 
Good outlier = 1, if the hospital counts as one of best 25%, otherwise 0 
Bad outlier = 1, if the hospital counts as one of worst 25%, otherwise 0 
Time trend = Trend variable for the considered quarters (from 1 to 16) 
Control variables (measured on hospital level) 
Patient attributes 
Age group = Age group of the treated patient (at 5-year intervals) 
Male = Sex of the treated patient, 1 if male, otherwise 0 
 
Further 0-1-coded dummy variables were formed to answer the question of whether the 
performance of the published quality could further influence patient behaviour. A "Total 
Rating" was calculated on the basis of information published in the Clinic Guide. Those 
hospitals (number), for which WIDO was able to supply patient data, were considered in 
this calculation. An average point figure was determined for every hospital, by summing 
up the points (four points: very high recommendation rate in the evaluated area; one point: 
very low recommendation rate in the evaluated area) for each professional department and 
each of the four evaluation areas (patient satisfaction, physician recommendation rate, 
number of operations, treatment quality) from the Clinic Guide and then divided by the 
number of evaluation fields. The dummy variable "good" was formed on the basis of this 
"Total Rating", whereby the dummy variable "good" was set to 1, if the hospital was 
counted as one of the relatively good hospitals (best 50% of the participating hospitals), 
otherwise it was set to 0.  
The dummy variations "good outlier" and "bad outlier" were formed to control positive and 
negative outliers. Thus the dummy variable "good outlier" was set to 1, if the hospital was 
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counted as being one of the best 25% of participating hospitals contained in the database. 
Finally, we consider data on age and sex to control for these patient attributes.  
 
Table 2 provides information on the average value and standard deviation for the case 
numbers and market shares for selected hospital groups, which will be discussed in the 
following econometric models. It becomes apparent that good hospitals achieve higher 
average case numbers and higher market shares than mediocre hospitals. Furthermore the 
data reveal that the average case numbers of the hospitals has increased since the publica-
tion of the Clinic Guide. It further becomes apparent that since publication the good hospi-
tals were able to realise a higher case numbers growth (+ 5 %) than relatively poor hospi-
tals (+ 3.24 %). These in turn could achieve a larger average growth rate than non-
publishing hospitals from the Rhine-Ruhr area (+2.23 %).  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obser-
vations 
Aver-
age 
value 
Stan-
dard 
devia-
tion 
Average 
value 
before  
Publica-
tion 
Average 
value  
after 
Publica-
tion 
Growth 
rate in % 
Case numbers analysis 
Case numbers 2512 640.67 521.32 631.08 656.64 + 4.04 
Case numbers of publishing hospi-
tals 
960 760.89 447.55 748.61 781.34 + 4.37 
Case numbers of non-publ. hospi-
tals in the Rhine-Ruhr region 
848 464.70 529.28 460.84 471.14 + 2.23 
Case numbers of non-publ. hospi-
tals from the metropolitan area 
Cologne-Bonn 
736     691.81    544.45       679.02 713.13 + 5.00 
Case numbers of good hospitals   480 833.95 513.12 818.58 859.56 + 5.01 
Case numbers of poor hospitals 480 657.38 305.26 649.49 670.54 + 3.24 
 
Further statistical processes now show whether the publication contributed to a change in 
market shares and case numbers. 
 
4.2 Estimation method 
We use a panel data structure to analyze the effects of quality information.7 The level 
which we observe is the hospital per quarter. 16 quarterly examinations from 2003 to 2006 
                                               
7
 For panel analysis, comp. e.g. Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). 
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are available for 157 hospitals from the Rhine-Ruhr region as well as from the metropoli-
tan area of Cologne-Bonn. As we are interested in the effect of publishing quality informa-
tion on hospital choice we apply a difference in difference estimator (Before-After-
estimation and considering a natural control group of hospitals from the region Cologne-
Bonn). Nevertheless we have to consider, that the endogenous variables possibly display 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. In order to reduce a potential underestimation of 
the standard error due to heteroscedasticity, we calculate robust standard errors, which are 
relatively insensitive to heteroscedasticity (Kohler and Kreuter 2005, p. 232). We take the 
potential problem of auto-correlation into account by including a first order auto-regressive 
process within the scope of a sensitivity analysis. Diagnostic tests were used to determine 
the functional form. STATA Version 9.0 was used as software for the econometric analy-
ses, 
 
4.3 Estimation models 
 
Against this background we use two basic models to review the previously listed hypothe-
ses. 
Model I: This tests the relation between the publication of quality information and the 
market shares or case numbers within the scope of a Fixed Effects estimation. 
Model II: Like Model I; additionally explanatory variables for the performance of the pub-
lishing hospital quality are included to test their influence on market shares and case num-
bers.    
 
Equation (15) presents the specification of Assessment Models I - III. 
 
(15) yit = ß1 + ß2cit + ß3xit + ui + εit, 
 
whereby yit stands for the dependent variable (depending on model, market share or case 
numbers) and the indices t and i for quarters (t) and hospitals (i). The coefficient of the 
intercept is displayed by ß1 . ß2 contains a vector for the coefficients of the explanatory 
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variables x (Rhine-Ruhr, Published, Good, Bad, …, comp. Table 2) and ß3 represents a 
vector for the coefficients of the control variables c (sex and age group, comp. Table 2). 
Finally, hospitals fixed effects are specified by the parameter ui and εit stands for the error 
term.  
 
In order to test the robustness of the determined results, the effects of alternative markets 
delineations as well as other coding of quality variables are examined for dependent vari-
ables within the scope of a sensitivity analysis.  
5 Results  
5.1 Core results 
Table 5 represents the estimation results of Model I and II. The estimation coefficients of 
the fixed effects estimation are presented in the table, because the Hausmann test has indi-
cated the advantage of this method for the investigation on hand. The correlation between 
publication of quality information and the development of hospital case numbers was 
tested in Model I. In order for the interpretation of the dummy variables to remain compre-
hensible, a sequential approach was followed for the regressions and the presentation of the 
regression results. 
 
Initially the explanatory variables “Time trend” and “After Publication” were taken on, 
besides the control variables (left column).  It becomes evident, that the hospitals have on 
average treated 2.97 more cases per quarter. After controlling for the time trend, the “After 
Publication” dummy indicates that no systematic differences between the period before 
and after publication of the Clinic Guide could be established. The interaction dummy 
“Published * After Publication” does, however show that significant differences do exist 
between hospitals which publish and hospitals which do not publish. Compared to the ref-
erence group of non-publishing hospitals, publishing hospitals can on average gain almost 
10 cases after publishing the Clinic Guide.  
 
In column 3 a test is finally done with the aid of the interaction variable “Rhein-Ruhr* Af-
ter Publication”, whether the publishing hospitals can expand case numbers against all 
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hospitals, or only against competing hospitals form the Rhine-Ruhr region. The results 
show that publishing hospitals from the Rhine-Ruhr region could make statistically signifi-
cant gains of 20.27 cases against non-publishing hospitals from the Rhine-Ruhr region 
(reference group). These have lost an average of 22.14 cases against the non-publishing 
hospitals from the Cologne-Bonn control group (reference group).8 This result leads to the 
presumption that publishing hospitals gain case numbers from competing hospitals. 9 
 
Table 5: Effects of the quality information on case numbers and market share  
(Model I) Variable 
Case numbers Case numbers Case numbers Market share50 
Explanatory  variables 
Time trend 2.97 (0.44)*** 2.97 (0.44)*** 2.97 (0.44)***  
After Publication 1.78 (3.74) 1.89 (4.17) 9.95 (5.52)* 0.044 (0.014)*** 
Rhine-Ruhr * After Publi-
cation  
  -22.14 (5.30)*** -0.747 (0.013)*** 
Published * After Publica-
tion 
 9.96 (4.47)** 20.27 (5.11)*** 0.029 (0.008)*** 
Control variables 
Age Group -28.56 (3.63)*** -28.30 (3.61)*** -27.72 (3.60)*** -0.047 (0.0069)*** 
Male 37.99 (13.55)*** 36.64 (12.84)*** 37.79 (12.87)*** 0.098 (0.0285)*** 
Number of observations 2512 2512 2512 2512 
Axis intercept 614.74 (3.10)*** 614.74 (3.096)*** 614.73 (3.077)*** 1.102 (0.006)*** 
F-value 45.64 37.16 32.16 30.27 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R² (within)  0.0928 0.0972 0.1004 0.0990 
Standard error in brackets, significance level: ***P < 0,01, **P < 0,05, *P < 0,10. 
 
In Model II an additional test was performed to establish the effect of quality of the pub-
lished data on the development of case numbers of the hospitals. The results in Table 6 
show – again after integration of the control variables – that relatively good hospitals could 
on average expand their case numbers by 19.50 cases compared to relatively poor hospi-
tals.  
Table 6: Effects of good and poor quality on case numbers and market shares 
                                               
8
 Special care must be taken when interpreting the coefficients, because two interaction variables have been 
taken on and the reference groups for the explanatory variable “After Publication” and the interaction vari-
able “Published * After Publication” change accordingly. The positive value of the variable After Publica-
tion shows in this case that hospitals from the greater region Cologne-Bonn could realise relative case in-
creases compared to the period before the transparency initiative. The hospitals could on average expand 
their case numbers by 9.95 cases compared to the reference (all hospitals before the publication of quality 
information). 
9
 The time invariant variable “Region” was taken on into the estimation within the framework of the random 
effects specification. This variable turned out to be insignificant.   
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(Model II) Variable 
Case numbers Market share 50 
Explanatory variables 
Time trend 2.97 (0.44)***  
After Publication 9.94 (5.51)* 0.044 (0.014)*** 
Rhine-Ruhr * After Publication -22.14 (5.30)*** -0.075 (0.013)*** 
Published * After Publication 8.84 (5.27)* 0.009 (0.008) 
Good* After Publication 19.50 (7.92)** 0.033 (0.012)** 
Rhine-Ruhr   
Control variables 
Age Group -27.67 (3.58)*** -0.047 (0.007)*** 
Male 37.79 (12.83)*** 0.098 (0.028)*** 
Number of observations 2512 2512 
Axis intercept 614.73 (3.072) 1.102 (0.006)*** 
F-value /Wald Chi2 28.21 26.66 
Prob > F / Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
R² (within) / R² 0.1030 0.1008 
Standard error in brackets, significance level: ***P < 0,01, **P < 0,05, *P < 0,10. 
 
Relatively poor and publishing hospitals are mirrored in the interaction variable “Published 
* After Publication”.  These hospitals expand their relative case numbers by 8.84 com-
pared to their reference group – the non-publishing hospitals in the Ruhr region. If one 
additionally looks at the control variables which taken on in Model I and Model II, it be-
comes evident that the age structure of treated patients shows a negative correlation and the 
portion of male patients shows a positive correlation with the number of treated cases re-
garding market share development.10   
 
It also becomes evident from Table 5 and Table 6, that similar statistical coherences could 
be established for relative market share of the hospitals. These results also show that pub-
lishing hospitals could gain relative market share compared to competing non-publishing 
hospitals. These hospitals could on average expand their market share by an absolute 
0.029% compared to non-publishing hospitals. If one observes the average market share of 
a hospital of 1.102%,11 then this corresponds to an average market share increase of 2.63% 
(increase from 1.102 to 1.131). It furthermore becomes evident, that the relative good hos-
pitals are the winners among the publishing hospitals. Publishing hospitals with above av-
erage quality could on average expand their market share by an absolute 0.033% against 
                                               
10
 Furthermore it becomes apparent that the observed hospitals on average treated 614.73 AOK patients in the 
first quarter. The variables gender and age group were centred on their medians, which allow the axis inter-
cept to be interpreted as average value. 
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above average poor hospitals. This corresponds to an average increase of 3.00% (increase 
from 1.102% to 1.135%).  
 
5.2 Results of the sensitivity analysis 
 
Various sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to test the robustness of the results. 
Table 7 present a selection of the analyses that were conducted. The left hand column 
shows that hospitals belonging to the best 25% of published hospitals could expand their 
market share by an absolute average of an additional 0.031% against their reference, those 
which are relatively good, but not among the best 25% (corresponds to an increase of mar-
ket share by 2.8%, from 1.103 to 1.134). However, this value is just marginally too low, to 
be of statistical significance. A value of statistical significance could also not be estab-
lished for the worst 25% (not shown in Table 7). 
 
The next column shows the result of an alternative market demarcation. This shows that 
the results in relation to market demarcation have proven to be robust, because only minor 
deviations from previous analyses have occurred (compare Table 6). An auto-regressive 
process of the first order was taken on in the estimation equation in column three, in order 
to address the autocorrelation problem. In this case, however, no statistically significant 
difference between publishing and non-publishing hospitals in the Ruhr region can be iden-
tified any more (not shown in Table 7). The “good hospitals” do, however, gain statisti-
cally significant more cases than their reference, the other hospitals in the Rhine-Ruhr re-
gion.  
Table 7: Selected results of the sensitivity analysis 
   Variable 
Market share50 Market share35 Market share50 
(AR) 
Explanatory variables 
After Publication 0.044 (0.014)** 0.057 (0.018)** -8.33 (6.82) 
Rhine-Ruhr * After Publication -0.074 (0.013)*** -0.094 (0.017)*** -10.56 (7.50) 
Published * After Publication 0.009 (0.008) 0.010 (0.013)  
Good * After Publication 0.017 (0.017) 0.048 (0.018)** 15.58 (8.28)* 
Good outlier * After Publication 0.031 (0.020)   
                                                                                                                                              
11
 In this case too, the variables gender and age group were centred on their medians, which allow the axis 
intercept to be interpreted as average value. 
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Control variables 
Age group -0.046 (0.007)*** -0.07 (0.01)*** -12.09 (3.72)*** 
Male 0.095 (0.028)*** 0.15 (0.04)*** 12.08 (19.27) 
Axis intercept 1.103 (0.006)*** 1.6410 (0.009)*** 601.40 (2.820)*** 
Number of observations 2520 2520 2355 
WaldChi2 / F 23.40 28.10 12.98 
Prob > Chi2 / Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R²  0.1018 0.1016 0.038 
Standard error in brackets, significance level: ***P < 0,01, **P < 0,05, *P < 0,10. 
 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
The quantitative-empirical analysis provides two fundamental results. Firstly: Hospitals 
voluntarily publishing their quality data measured on the basis of case numbers and market 
shares are in stronger demand than those not publishing their quality data while competing 
with the publishing hospitals. Consequentially, the non-publishing hospitals in the Rhine-
Ruhr region lose relative case numbers and market shares to their publishing competitors. 
Secondly: In the group containing publishing hospitals, the publication of quality informa-
tion results in hospitals with below average quality to be selected less often than hospitals 
with above-average quality.  
 
As Section 5 has shown, these results are statistically significant. At the same time we 
should note that the effects are relatively low. For example, good hospitals were able to 
extend their market shares when compared to poor hospitals with an average of 3 % (abso-
lute growth by 0.033 %). This may be caused by various reasons: firstly, patients and their 
referrers may not have been aware of the published data despite public relations at the time 
of decision (Section 2, Schneider and Epstein 1996 as well as Schneider and Epstein 1998). 
Secondly, the use of the data could have been affected by the GP's or friends', relatives' and 
acquaintances’ contradictory recommendations. Thirdly, the published data could have 
only confirmed already existing expectations. In this context recent studies were able to 
show, that in particular deviations from expected quality lead to changes in case numbers 
and market shares (Dafny and Dranove 2005, Chernew et al. 2007 as well as Mukamel 
2004/2005). As an example, Mukamel (2004/2005) could show that hospitals displaying a 
positive (negative) deviation of the expected quality were able to increase case numbers 
(had to cope with losses). Fourthly, the patients and their referrers may not have trusted the 
data, misinterpreted them or not have understood them and thus not have used them as a 
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decision tool (Marshall 2000). Fifthly and finally, a further reason for the small reaction of 
the patients to the data may be that patients were unable to use the data due to an existing 
emergency, even if they were aware of the information. 
 
Integration into existing literature 
The results of the quantitative analysis comply with a number of studies existing in the 
Anglo-Saxon area, according to which "good hospitals" were able to achieve a significant 
but low growth rate of market shares after the publication of quality information and "poor 
hospitals" had to handle slight losses respectively (Section 2). However, the study does 
provide additional information over and beyond the findings of existing examinations. 
Thus this relationship is found empirical in Germany for the first time. Furthermore, it is 
shown for the first time that non-publishing, competing hospitals also have to accept rela-
tive losses and even do slightly worse (statistically insignificant) than over-average badly 
evaluated hospitals. This result supports the model-theoretic considerations, that voluntary 
publication explicitly contributes to a reduction of uncertainty and that, in consequence, 
publishing hospitals are selected with a larger probability than non-publishing, competing 
hospitals.12  
 
Apart from the generated new findings, this study displays two further significant strengths 
when compared to most existing studies. 
 
A large strength of the examination lies within the "Clinic Guide Ruhr Region" examina-
tion object. In the case of this transparency initiative high methodical standards were ap-
plied during quality measurement.13 Not only structural but also process and outcome indi-
cators were reported, which complies with the information preferences of the patients.14 At 
the same time, the resident physicians significant for referral were included within the 
scope of a survey, which presumably increased the acceptance of the transparency initia-
tive from the referrer but also from the patient side. These factors are discussed in literature 
as important ancillary conditions for the effectiveness of the publication of quality infor-
                                               
12
 Interpreted differently, the lack of data publication is negatively perceived by the patients. 
13
 Comp. to the various methods of risk adjustment applied by the BQS (2007), which measured the outcome 
data. 
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mation (Schaeffer 2006 or Section 2). Finally, we are of the opinion that cognitive-
psychological findings were implemented in the display of the Clinic Guide data using 
simple star ratings, etc..  
 
The second significant strength of the examination can be found in the study design and in 
the data record. Analyzing the case numbers and market share after relative to before the 
adoption of the Klinikführer-Ruhrgebiet using fixed-effects-estimation allows for time 
invariant correlation between reported and time invariant, unobserved quality. Further-
more, unobserved dynamic aspects were respectively considered by including a first order 
auto-regressive process within the scope of a sensitivity analysis. On top of that, the forma-
tion of a control group for the Cologne-Bonn area aided in generating a quasi experimental 
design, which is deemed the gold standard for the determination of causality between the 
endogenous and exogenous variable in empirical assessment models and increases the 
probability of achieving valid assessment results (Holland 1986). This strategy requires 
fewer restrictive assumptions than other existing analyses, which rely on untestable as-
sumptions to identify the effect of interest (Bundorf et al. 2008).  
 
Apart from the existing strengths of the examination, it is also important to indicate limita-
tions. Firstly, only data of patients from the General Medical Insurance Plans could be used 
for this examination. We are of the opinion that this underestimates the effect of quality 
information. Private patients are not considered which usually originate from higher educa-
tional and income levels as well as from younger age groups and which are thus more 
likely to react to published information (Mukamel and Mushlin 1998 or Romano and Zhou 
2004). Furthermore, the results cannot be transferred to other German regions in an unlim-
ited manner, as the Ruhr Region is characterised by a high degree of urbanisation and high 
hospital density. As other studies were able to show, the possibility of changing to closer 
located alternative providers is of high significance in the patients' decision to select the 
respective hospital (Varkevisser und van de Geest 2007 or Tai et al. 2004). Finally, we 
were not able to use the data to perform a disease-specific analysis. A respective analysis 
would have been able to provide additional differentiated findings.15 
                                                                                                                                              
14
 Comp. ibidem. 
15
 Comp. e.g. Varkevisser, M. and S. van der Geest (2006) within the scope of a Mobility Analysis. 
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Political decision makers, hospitals and financing bodies should basically expect that the 
publication of quality data will influence the patients' and/or the referrer behaviour. The 
consequences drawn by the political decision makers basically depend on whether the 
quality measurement of hospital quality can be adequately displayed. An important prereq-
uisite is that the quality measurement is able to correctly consider patient differences in 
illness severity (Key word: Risk adjustment).16 If this is possible, the hospitals should (i) 
have an incentive to make quality information accessible and (ii) maintain the quality of 
the rendered services at a high standard. The patients would then regard such information 
as an aid for better orientation. In this case, politics should set adequate frame conditions, 
so that the publication of quality information does actually take place.  
                                               
16
 Critically compare the hazards associated with the publication of quality information, insofar as risk ad-
justment does not function correctly, e.g. Cutler, D.M., Huckman, R.S and M.B. Landrum, Schneider, E.C 
and A.M. Epstein (1996) as well as Dranove, D. et al. (2003). In this case an empirical examination is used 
to indicate the danger of an existing tendency to refuse patients with higher risks. 
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